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THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, by Stephen 
Gardbaum 1
NICOLAS FRANCIS
THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS under constitutional law is usually considered to 
function under either one of two polar options: legislative supremacy,2 derived from 
the British tradition of parliamentary supremacy; or constitutional supremacy,3 
derived from the American tradition of an entrenched, judicially enforced bill 
of rights. In his new book, Th e New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 
Stephen Gardbaum argues that a third, superior model of constitutionalism exists 
that draws on the strengths of the two traditional paradigms without harbouring 
the weaknesses found within either of them.
Gardbaum situates the new model in an intermediate position between the 
two traditional forms by identifying its three central features. First, there must be 
a legalized bill or charter of rights. Second, there must be some form of judicial 
power to interpret and enforce these rights by assessing legislation. Th ird, and 
most distinctively, there must be a legislative power that maintains the fi nal word 
on the law by way of an override power.4
1. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 270 pages.
2.  See e.g. Jeremy Waldron, “Th e Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115:6 
Yale LJ 1346; Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare 
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); 
Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
3.  See e.g. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Th eory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: Th e Moral Reading of the 
American Constitution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
4.  Supra note 1 at 34.
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Th e new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism is named after the 
four countries on which Gardbaum focuses (Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia).5 His book has two main goals.6 It aims to present the 
new Commonwealth model as a novel model of constitutionalism, and it assesses 
whether and to what extent the model is currently operating. To achieve these 
goals, it is divided into two parts that respectively explore the theory and practice 
of the new model.
After a brief introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 explains the new model and 
attempts to distinguish it from the two traditional forms of constitutionalism by 
identifying what is new about the new model.7 Gardbaum argues that its novelty 
lies in its combining of two forms of rights protection—political rights review and 
weak-form judicial review—while providing a clear mechanism to separate 
judicial review from judicial supremacy.8
Chapter 3 shifts from an analytical to a normative argument, presenting the 
general case for the new model as a third and intermediate form of constitutionalism.9 
Th is chapter engages with the debate about the merits of judicial review.10 Gardbaum 
argues that the new model permits “proportional representation” of the best arguments 
for legislative and constitutional supremacy, and minimizes the weaknesses of the 
two paradigms. Th is is because central to the new model is both weak-form 
legislative review and weak-form judicial review.11
Chapter 4 develops the internal normative theory for the new model by 
discussing how the model ought to ideally function.12 Th is chapter explores the 
5.  Ibid at 11.
6.  Ibid at 16.
7.  Ibid at 21.
8.  Ibid at 33.
9.  Ibid at 47.
10.  See e.g. Richard H Fallon Jr, “Th e Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review” (2008) 121:7 
Harv L Rev 1693; Alon Harel & Tsvi Kahana, “Th e Easy Core Case for Judicial Review” 
(2010) 2:1 J Legal Analysis 1; Mattias Kumm, “Institutionalising Socratic Contestation: Th e 
Rationalist Human Rights Paradigm, Legitimate Authority and the Point of Judicial Review” 
(2007) 1:2 European J L Stud 1; Mattias Kumm, “Democracy is not Enough: Rights, 
Proportionality and the Point of Judicial Review” in Matthias Klatt, ed, Institutionalized 
Reason: Th e Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mark 
Tushnet, “How Diff erent are Waldron’s and Fallon’s Core Cases for and against Judicial 
Review” (2010) 30:1 Oxford J L Stud 49; Waldron, supra note 2; Wil Waluchow, A Common 
Law Th eory of Judicial Review: Th e Living Tree (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).
11.  Supra note 1 at 61.
12.  Ibid at 77.
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norms that ought to govern each of the three stages of the new model, and also 
explores the question of when a legislature should exercise its legal override power.
In Part II, the book shifts from the theoretical to the practical. Chapters 5 
to 8 describe four instantiations—Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
and Australia respectively—of the new model. Within these chapters, Gardbaum 
assesses how successful each version of the model is in delivering the theoretical 
benefi ts discussed in Part I, and he identifi es the major practical problems that 
have emerged within each jurisdiction.
Chapter 9 ties the previous chapters together and presents an assessment 
of the analytical and normative claims made in Part I in light of the “operational 
experience” presented in chapters 5 to 8.13 In the process, Gardbaum also critically 
examines sceptical claims that the new model is unstable or insuffi  ciently unique 
from constitutional supremacy. Acknowledging the diffi  culties in adhering to the 
theoretical framework of the new model, Gardbaum concludes by providing a 
series of reforms that may help the new model better achieve its normative goals 
in practice.
Th e New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism is an ambitious project 
with signifi cant implications for constitutional theory and practice. Th e new 
model, if truly a viable alternative to legislative and constitutional supremacy, will 
fundamentally recast the choice constitutional drafters encounter when dealing 
with the subject of rights protection.
13.  Ibid at 222.
